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NOTE
CONSTITUTION-The Constitutionality of Sodomy Stat-
utes as Applied to Homosexual Behavior. Bowers v. Hard-
wick, 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986).
Homosexuality and the rights of homosexuals are often a
matter of heated debate. This debate recently found its way to
the Supreme Court in Bowers v. Hardwick, 1 where a practicing
homosexual challenged the constitutionality of a Georgia stat-
ute which criminalized consensual sodomy.2 In a bare major-
ity, the Court upheld the statute stating that the federal
Constitution does not protect private, consensual homosexual
behavior from state proscription.3 The decision paints a bleak
picture for those concerned with the rights of homosexuals, as
it is already being used as precedent in jurisdictions anxious to
enforce statutes similar to that of Georgia.4
This article will trace the history of the constitutional right
of privacy as applied to state sodomy statutes and then ana-
lyze and critique the Court's rationale and holding in Bowers.
The Bowers holding will then be analyzed as to the effect of
the decision on future similar litigation.
1. 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986).
2. (a) A person commits the offense of sodomy when he performs or submits to
any sexual act involving the sex organs of one person and the mouth or anus of
another. A person commits the offense of aggravated sodomy when he commits
sodomy with force and against the will of the other person.
(b) A person convicted of the offense of sodomy shall be punished by im-
prisonment for not less than one or more than 20 years. A person convicted of
the offense of aggravated sodomy shall be punished by imprisonment for life or
by imprisonment for not less than one nor more than 20 years.
GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2 (1984).
3. The statute was upheld as applied to homosexual conduct. The Court expressed
no opinion regarding the constitutionality of the statute as it applied to other acts of
sodomy. Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2842 n.2.
4. The Missouri Supreme Court relied on the decision in State v. Walsh, 713
S.W.2d 508 (Mo. 1986). The Walsh case represents the first defeat of challenges to the
state sodomy statutes since Bowers. The American Civil Liberties Union reports that
three such challenges are pending in federal courts. They expect dismissals in all three.
Reidinger, Missouri Vice, 72 A.B.A. J. 78, 78 (1986).
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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On August 3, 1982, the Atlanta Police arrested Michael
Hardwick for the commission of the crime of sodomy with a
consenting male adult in the bedroom of Hardwick's home.
After charges were brought against Mr. Hardwick, the Dis-
trict Attorney's office declined to present the case to the grand
jury unless further evidence developed.
Hardwick then filed suit in federal district court, challeng-
ing the constitutionality of the statute insofar as it criminal-
ized consensual sodomy. Hardwick was joined in the action
by John and Mary Doe, a married couple with whom he was
acquainted.5 The district court granted the defendant's mo-
tion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed.6
Relying on previous Supreme Court decisions, 7 the court held
that homosexual activity is a private and intimate association
and as such is a fundamental right protected by the due pro-
cess clause of the fourteenth amendment. 8 The case was re-
versed and remanded as to the "privacy claim." 9
Subsequently, the State of Georgia filed a petition for
certiorari.
Due to the fact that other courts of appeal had arrived at
judgments contrary to that of the Eleventh Circuit, the
Supreme Court granted the petition for certiorari. 10 The
5. The Does claimed that they desired to engage in sexual activity proscribed by the
statute but that they had been "chilled and deterred" by the existence of the statute and
Hardwick's arrest. Hardwick v. Bowers, 760 F.2d 1202 (1lth Cir. 1985), reh'g denied,
765 F.2d 1123 (l1th Cir. 1985).
The district court ruled that the Does did not have standing to bring suit as they had
neither sustained nor werelikely to sustain any direct injury from enforcement of the
statute. Accordingly, their claim was dismissed. Id. at 1206-07.
6. Id. at 1202.
7. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972);
Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
8. Hardwick, 760 F.2d at 1212-13.
9. Id. at 1213. "In order to prevail, the state, on remand must prove both a com-
pelling interest to regulate such behavior and that the statute was narrowly drawn to
serve that interest." Note, Hardwick v. Bowers: An Attempt to Pull the Meaning of
Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney Out of the Closet, 39 U. MIAMI L. REV. 973, 975-76
(1985) (citing Hardwick, 760 F.2d at 1202).
10. Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 392 (1985).
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Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Ap-
peals, thereby affirming the constitutionality of the statute."
II. BACKGROUND
Most challenges to state sodomy statutes have asserted the
constitutional right of privacy' 2 recognized by the Supreme
Court in Griswold v. Connecticut.13 Therefore, this section
will commence with a discussion of the development of this
right of privacy before addressing its application to sodomy
statutes.
A. The Constitutional Right of Privacy
The origins of the constitutional right of privacy were es-
tablished by the Supreme Court in Griswold, which held that a
Connecticut statute prohibiting all persons from using contra-
ceptives was unconstitutional. The Court found the statute
and its enforcement to be violative of a married couple's right
of privacy.14
Justice Douglas, writing for the majority, conceded that
such a right could not be found on the face of the Constitu-
tion. However, he stated that the right was created from
"penumbras" of the Bill of Rights, "by emanations from those
guarantees that help give them life and substance."' 5
After Griswold, the Court had little trouble extending this
right of privacy to protect an interracial couple's decision to
marry;' 6 a person's right to view obscene material in the pri-
vacy of his home;17 or a woman's decision of whether to abort
11. Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 2841, 2843 (1986).
12. The statutes have also been attacked on the basis of the equal protection clause
of the fourteenth amendment, the protection against cruel and unusual punishment
found in the eighth amendment, and the ninth amendment. However, the scope and
length of this article do not allow for these areas to be addressed. See Comment, The
Right of Privacy and Other Constitutional Challenges to Sodomy Statutes, 15 U. TOL. L.
REv. 811, 845-65 (1984) for a discussion of the various alternative challenges.
13. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
14. Id. at 485-86.
15. Id. at 484. The Court claimed that the Bill of Rights by its explicit protections
of the freedoms of speech, association, freedom from unreasonable search and seizure,
etc., has "emanations" which create a "penumbra" which protect certain freedoms not
mentioned explicitly in the text of the Constitution. Such a freedom is the right of
privacy. Id. at 484-86.
16. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
17. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
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a pregnancy.18 In doing so, the Court employed a "substan-
tive due process analysis" rather than the Griswold "penum-
bral" rationale.19 Nevertheless, these decisions, coupled with
the Griswold holding, created a sphere of personal autonomy
relating to certain personal decisions.20
It should be noted that there has been criticism of the
methodology employed by the Court in the establishment and
extension of the constitutional right of privacy. This method-
ology has been attacked as judicial legislation and as an ex-
pression of judicial ideology.21 Regardless, the Court appears
committed to the idea that a right of privacy exists as a prod-
uct of the Constitution. The Court reiterated this idea in Roe
v. Wade,22 when it stated: "personal rights that can be
deemed 'fundamental' or 'implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty,'. . . are included in this guarantee of personal
privacy. ' 23
B. The Constitutional Right of Privacy and Sodomy
Statutes
Once recognized, the constitutional right of privacy devel-
oped in Griswold and its progeny was used as a basis for at-
tacking the constitutionality of state sodomy statutes.
However, courts were uncertain as to the extent to which this
18. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). Later in Planned Parenthood v. Danforth,
428 U.S. 52 (1976), the right was extended to minors when the Court held unconstitu-
tional the provisions of a state statute requiring parental consent for an abortion by an
unmarried woman under the age of eighteen during the first twelve weeks of pregnancy.
19. A "substantive due process analysis" is based upon the idea that the due pro-
cess clause of the fourteenth amendment protects certain "fundamental rights." Bowers
v. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986). The Court seems firmly committed to the use of
substantive due process. See Comment, supra note 12, at 835.
20. Note, Dronenburg v. Zech: The Right of Privacy And Its Future, 14 CAP. U.L.
REV. 313, 319 (1985) (citing Note, Consent, Not Morality, As the Proper Limitation on
Sexual Privacy, 4 HASTiNGS CONST. L.Q. 637, 654 (1977), which asserted that the
Court, through prior decisions, has impliedly protected the "underlying decision re-
garding sexual behavior").
21. A discussion of the various criticisms of Griswold, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), and its
progeny is beyond the scope of this article. However, see Comment, supra note 12, at
823-34, for just such a discussion.
22. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
23. Id. at 152 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)). The per-
sonal intimacies of marriage, the home, procreation and the family are the "fundamen-
tal rights" alluded to in Roe. Roe, 410 U.S. at 152-53.
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constitutional right of privacy should be applied to protect
consensual sexual activity. 4
Utilizing the right of privacy rationale, federal and state
courts have had little trouble striking down state sodomy stat-
utes as applied to consensual heterosexual activity.25 How-
ever, as will be seen, these same courts have been hesitant to
extend the same protection to homosexual activity.
In one of the first successful challenges by a homosexual to
discriminatory practices the Federal District Court of Mary-
land, in Acanfora v. Board of Education,26 declared the right
to engage in homosexual activity to be a fundamental right.
This successful attack appeared to lay the groundwork for fur-
ther inroads toward the abolition of discriminatory applica-
tion of state sodomy statutes. However, in 1976 the Supreme
Court's summary afflirmance of Doe v. Commonwealth28 im-
peded this progress.
In Doe, two homosexual men sought a declaratory judg-
ment and injunctive relief to bar the enforcement of a Virginia
sodomy statute as applied to acts between consenting adults.
Their claim was based, among other things, on the due pro-
cess clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments. 29 Never-
theless, the District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia
24. Comment, supra note 12, at 844-45.
25. In Cotner v. Henry, 394 F.2d 873 (7th Cir.), cert denied, 393 U.S. 847 (1968),
the Seventh Circuit held that an Indiana statute could not constitutionally regulate the
private consensual behavior of married persons and be consistent with Griswold. In
Lovisi v. Slayton, 539 F.2d 349 (4th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 977 (1976),
marital intimacies, including the right to engage in sodomy, were held to be protected
by the constitutional right of privacy. Similarly, in State v. Pilcher, 242 N.W.2d 348
(Iowa 1976), the Iowa Supreme Court held that sodomy statutes cannot regulate the
private consensual activity between members of the opposite sex. This protection, how-
ever, was not extended to homosexual activity. But see State v. Bateman, 113 Ariz. 107,
547 P.2d 6 (1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 864 (1977).
26. 359 F. Supp. 843 (D. Md. 1973), aff'd on other grounds, 491 F.2d 498 (4th Cir.
1974).
27. Acanfora was not charged with violation of a state sodomy statute but was
contesting his transfer from a classroom teaching position to a non-teaching position
due to his admission of homosexuality. In addition, the actions of the Board of Educa-
tion were attacked on equal protection grounds. Id. at 844.
28. 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975), aff'd mem, 425 U.S. 901, rehg denied, 425
U.S. 985 (1976).
29. Their claim was also based upon the first amendment guarantee of freedom of
expression, the first and ninth amendments guarantee of the right of privacy, and the
eighth amendment protection against cruel and unusual punishment. Id. at 1200.
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held that none of these claims were a bar to prosecution of
private homosexual behavior. 30  The district court acknowl-
edged the right of sexual privacy but only in the area of deci-
sions relating to the home, marriage and the family.31 In 1976
the Supreme Court summarily affirmed the Doe decision.32
While the majority of the district court in Doe appeared
firm in its denial of the right of privacy to homosexuals, the
precedential significance of the Supreme Court's summary af-
firmance is limited due to the fact that the Court failed to ex-
plain exactly what it was affirming.33 This opened the door to
speculation on the part of courts and commentators alike.
There has been widescale disagreement as to whether the af-
firmance was based upon the plaintiff's lack of standing or the
privacy issue.34 Subsequent decisions highlight this problem.
In People v. Onofre,35 the New York Court of Appeals, in a
holding which extended protection to homosexual activity,
found a state sodomy statute directed only toward unmarried
persons to be violative of the constitutional right of privacy.
Contrary to the holding in Doe, the Onofre Court defined pri-
vacy as the freedom to make choices about one's intimate af-
fairs regardless of sexual orientation.36
30. The central theme of the decision was that the existence of similar statutes in
other states, and biblical prohibitions against the conduct in question, support the exist-
ence of the statute. Id. at 1202-03. See also Comment, supra note 12, at 838.
31. Doe, 403 F. Supp. at 1202-03.
32. 425 U.S. 901, reh'g denied, 425 U.S. 985 (1976).
33. Because the Court has obligatory jurisdiction over appeals, orders summarily
affirming or dismissing are decisions on the merits and binding on lower courts. Most
often, these lower courts are faced with the task of determining what the Supreme Court
decided, without the aid of a written opinion. See 12 J. MOORE, H. BENDIX & B.
RINGLE, MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 400.05-1 (2d ed. 1982).
34. See Note, supra note 9, at 977.
35. 51 N.Y.2d 476, 415 N.E.2d 936, 434 N.Y.S.2d 947 (1980), cert. denied, 451
U.S. 987 (1981).
36. Id. at _, 415 N.E.2d 936-42, 934 N.Y.S.2d at 949-53. See Wilkinson & White,
Constitutional Protection for Personal Lifestyles, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 563, 590 (1977).
In addition, a year after Doe, the Court in a decision which did not implicate sodomy
concerns observed: "the Court has not definitively answered the difficult question
whether and to what extent the Constitution prohibits state statutes regulating [private
consensual sexual] behavior among adults." Carey v. Populaton Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S.
678, 688 (1977).
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Conversely, in Dronenburg v. Zech,37 the Doe decision was
cited as one of the cases which expressly denied an extension
of the right of privacy to homosexual conduct.3 Later, in
Baker v. Wade,39 the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
stated: "[tihere can be no question but that the decision of the
Supreme Court in Doe was on the merits of the case, not on
the standing of the plaintiffs to bring the suit."' 4
As the aforementioned discussion illustrates, decisions re-
garding sodomy statutes prior to Bowers v. Hardwick41 were
characterized by uncertainty. The confusion generated by the
summary affirmance in Doe contributed greatly to the lack of
pattern in those cases. After the Court granted the petition
for certiorari in Bowers, many commentators felt that the un-
answered questions relating to the privacy rights of homosex-
uals would finally be resolved. 42
III. THE DECISION
A. White's Majority Opinion
Writing for the majority, Justice White refused to accept
the proposition that the Court's prior decisions have con-
strued the Constitution to confer a right of privacy that ex-
tends to homosexual sodomy:43
[W]e think it evident that none of the rights announced in
those cases bears any resemblance to the claimed constitu-
tional right of homosexuals to engage in acts of sodomy that
is asserted in this case. No connection between family, mar-
riage or procreation on the one hand and homosexual activ-
ity on the other has been demonstrated .... '
37. 741 F.2d 1388 (D.C. Cir.), reh'g denied (en bane), 746 F.2d 1579 (D.C. Cir.
1984). Dronenburg, a naval petty officer, was discharged after he admitted that he was
a homosexual and had engaged in homosexual acts in violation of Navy regulations. Id.
See also Note, supra note 20, at 314. While this Navy regulation is not a sodomy statute
per se, it parallels those statutes discussed in this article.
38. Dronenburg, 741 F.2d at 1391-92.
39. 769 F.2d 289 (5th Cir.) reh'g denied (en bane), 774 F.2d 1285 (5th Cir. 1985).
40. Id. at 292.
41. 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986).
42. Note, supra note 9, at 994.
43. Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 2841, 2843-44 (1986) (citing Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113 (1973)); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479 (1965); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); Pierce v. Society of Sisters,
268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
44. Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2844.
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
Applying a substantive due process analysis, the Court
held that the right to engage in acts of homosexual sodomy
was not a fundamental right protected by the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment. 5 Justice White stated
that only those rights " 'implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty,' such that 'neither liberty nor justice would exist if
[they] were sacrificed,' "46 and those " 'deeply rooted in the
Nation's history and tradition'"47 would qualify as "funda-
mental" rights.
Neither of these descriptions, asserted Justice White, ex-
tends a fundamental right to homosexuals to engage in
sodomous acts. The ancient roots and long standing tradi-
tions surrounding sodomous conduct was offered as justifica-
tion for this conclusion.48 In this context, a claim that a right
to engage in homosexual sodomy is "deeply rooted in this Na-
tion's history and tradition" was held to be absurd.4 9 The
Court went on to note that the lack of textual support in the
Constitution reinforced its hesitancy to expand the substantive
reach of the due process clauses to include the right to engage
in homosexual sodomy.5
Lastly, relying on Stanley v. Georgia,51 Hardwick argued
that his conduct should be protected due to the fact that it
occurred in the privacy of his home. The Court refused to
accept this position stating that the Stanley decision was
"firmly grounded in the First Amendment,"52 and therefore is
inapplicable as this case does not deal with printed material. 3
45. Id.
46. Id. (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325-26 (1937)).
47. Id. (quoting Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)).
48. Sodomy statutes date back to Henry III and still exist in 24 states and the
District of Columbia. Id. at 2844-45 nn.5-7 (citing Survey on the Constitutional Right to
Privacy in the Context of Homosexual Activity, 40 U. MIAMI L. REv. 521, 524 n.9
(1986)). See also Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2847 n.1.
49. Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2846.
50. Id. Justice White stated: "The Court is most vulnerable and comes nearest to
illegitimacy when it deals with judge made constitutional law having little or no cogni-
zable roots in the language or design of the Constitution." Id.
51. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
52. Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2846. As will be discussed later in this article, the major-
ity appears to misinterpret the holding of Stanley.
53. Id. The majority goes on to state that should they decide to employ the "pri-
vacy of the home" rationale it would open up some sort of "Pandora's Box" in which
the Court might have to legitimize acts such as adultery and incest that occur in the
privacy of the home. Id.
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The Court concluded by stating that the law bore a rational
relation to a permissible state goal - the enforcement of
morality.5 4
B. Blackmun's Dissenting Opinion
The issue at hand, urged Justice Blackmun, was not the
narrow idea that homosexuals have a right to privacy relating
to their sexual conduct, but that they like everyone, have a
"right to be let alone."'5 5 This right was created by the Court's
previous privacy decisions, and had two facets: the right to
decisional privacy 6 and the right to spatial privacy. 7  This
case implicated both those concerns.5 8
Unlike the majority, Justice Blackmun felt that the
Court's previous decisions regarding marriage,5 9 procreation 60
and the family6' recognized a right of decisional privacy or
personal autonomy. This decisional privacy encompassed the
right to choose one's own sexual partners. This is because the
right of consensual, intimate relations, like the other afore-
mentioned rights, "[florms so central a part of an individual's
54. The two concurring opinions by former Chief Justice Burger and Justice Powell
add little to the discussion. Former Chief Justice Burger's opinion merely underscores
the majority sentiment that there is no such thing as a fundamental right to commit
homosexual sodomy. The former Chief Justice reinforces this by reiterating the idea
that homosexuality has been considered a "disgrace to human nature for centuries" and
that sodomy laws have "ancient roots." Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 2841, 2847
(1986) (Burger, C. J., concurring).
Justice Powell also agrees that there is no fundamental right to engage in homosex-
ual sodomy. However, he does point out that Hardwick may be protected by the eighth
amendment's safeguards from cruel and unusual punishment. But, since Hardwick was
neither tried nor convicted and, in fact, had not raised the issue below, Justice Powell
concluded that the issue was not properly before the Court. Bowers v. Hardwick, 106
S. Ct. 2841, 2847-48 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring).
55. Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 2841, 2848 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
The "right to be let alone" is considered to be "the most comprehensive of rights and
the right most valued by civilized men." Id. (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277
U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
56. Id. at 2850-51 (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)).
57. Id. at 2851 (citing United States v. Karo 468 U.S. 705 (1984)).
58. Id. at 2850. Blackmun stated that privacy grounds are not the only ones on
which Hardwick may be entitled to relief: "[N]either the Eighth Amendment nor the
Equal Protection Clause is so clearly irrelevant that a claim resting on either provision
should be peremptorily dismissed." Id. at 2849-50.
59. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
60. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 318 U.S. 479 (1965); Roe, 410 U.S. 113.
61. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
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life."' 62 The fact that an individual chooses a homosexual life-
style should not detract from this right. "A way of life that is
odd ... but interferes with no rights or interests of others is
not to be condemned because it is different. '63
Justice Blackmun further contended that the language of
the fourth amendment provided protection for Hardwick's be-
havior since it occurred in the privacy of his home.64 He
stated that the majority's treatment of this aspect of the case
and its reading of Stanley were erroneous.65
Justice Blackmun held that the major thrust of Stanley
was that the fourth amendment provided special protection
from the breach of "the right to satisfy [one's] intellectual and
emotional needs in the privacy of [one's] own home."' 66 Con-
sensual acts of homosexual sodomy fall within this sphere of
influence. Therefore, as long as these acts are carried on in
the privacy of the home, protection is warranted.67
In a lengthy conclusion, Justice Blackmun discussed the
majority's failure to address whether the State of Georgia
properly justified the infringement of the aforementioned
rights. The Justice stated that no such justification existed.
Specifically, Justice Blackmun observed that the acts in ques-
tion posed no threat to the public's safety or welfare. In addi-
tion, he felt that the law did nothing more than enforce a
system of private morality, and as such, was an unacceptable
intrusion into an individual's intimate affairs.68
62. Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2851.
63. Id. at 2852 (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 223-24 (1972)).
64. "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and ef-
fects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated ...... U.S.
CONST. amend. IV.
65. Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2852. Recall that according to the majority, Stanley relied
entirely on the first amendment, and thus, it claimed, shed no light on cases not involv-
ing printed materials.
66. Id. (quoting Stanley, 394 U.S. at 564-65). In addition, in Paris Adult Theater I
v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 66 (1973), the Court suggested that " 'reliance on the fourth
amendment not only supported the Court's outcome in Stanley but was actually neces-
sary to it.'" Id. at 2853 (emphasis added in Bowers).
67. "Indeed, the right of an indvidual to conduct intimate relationships in the inti-
macy of his or her own home seems to me to be the heart of the Constitution's protec-
tion of privacy." Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2853.
68. Id.
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C. Stevens' Dissenting Opinion
Justice Stevens, in his dissent, took a broad, literal reading
of the statute involved, 69 noting that it applied to sodomous
activity regardless of who is involved.70 He went on to state
that a proper analysis of the constitutional question first re-
quired a determination of whether the statute may constitu-
tionally proscribe all sodomous behavior. If it does not, the
Court should address whether the statute may be saved by
enforcement only against homosexuals.7 1 In response to the
first question, Justice Stevens followed traditional notions that
the Griswold line of cases protected society's right to engage in
conduct proscribed by the Georgia statute.72
Since the Georgia statute is not enforced as written, Jus-
tice Stevens asserted that the state must justify its selective
enforcement of the law against homosexuals. 73 This, the Jus-
tice contended, it could not do. Homosexuals are to be ac-
corded the same liberty interests as members of the
heterosexual population. Those interests include the right of
voluntary association both publicly and privately. Secondly,
the state can show no compelling interest for the infringement
of the fundamental rights of homosexuals. The mere dislike
or unacceptance of a certain lifestyle was not sufficient. 74
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Critique
Justice Blackmun characterized the majority opinion as an
"overall refusal to consider the broad principles that have in-
formed [the Court's] treatment of privacy in specific cases. '7 5
The majority's inflexibility was further exposed when it re-
fused to announce a fundamental right to engage in homosex-
ual sodomy protected by the fourteenth amendment's due
process clause. The Court cited the ancient roots of sodomy
laws and the lack of textual support in the body of the Consti-
69. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2 (1984). See also supra note 2 and accompanying text.
70. Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 2841, 2856-57 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
71. Id. at 2857.
72. Id. at 2858.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 2858-59.
75. Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 2841, 2852 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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tution as justification for this refusal. Neither of these bases
seem adequate in today's progressive society.
The Court was unwilling to apply its previous right of pri-
vacy decisions any further than the narrow factual situations
they encompass. While it was true that the decisions center
around the family, marriage and procreation, they had in ef-
fect created a sphere of privacy, the boundaries of which ex-
tend beyond their facts. "We protect those rights not because
they contribute ... to the general public welfare, but because
they form so central a part of an individual's life."76 The right
to make decisions regarding one's intimate affairs is most cer-
tainly "central" to each individual's life. As such, this right
warrants protection. The fact that an individual chooses a ho-
mosexual lifestyle should not detract from this right. Other
than a mere denial of this proposition, the majority can cite no
reason why this should not be.
Societal values have seen a great deal of change since the
signing of the Constitution. Homosexuality is no longer con-
sidered an illness or disease. Rather, it is viewed as an alter-
native lifestyle, different, yet accepted. The idea that a
homosexual's right to engage in private consensual sexual ac-
tivity should be legislatively proscribed is repugnant to a mod-
em value system. As Justice Holmes once stated:
It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than
that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still
more revolting if the grounds upon which it was laid down
have vanished long since, and the rule simply persists from
blind imitation of the past."
The majority refuses to expand the substantive reach of
the due process clause if it means a redefinition of the category
of rights deemed to be fundamental. The fear of being labeled
judicial legislators is the main reason for this refusal.78
Without a doubt, the same concerns surrounded the Court
during the decade in which the Griswold line of cases was be-
ing decided. Yet the holdings in those cases established pow-
erful precedent which survives today. Dealing with highly
controversial areas, the Court viewed the Constitution as a
76. Id. at 2851.
77. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897).
78. Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2846.
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document for all ages designed to protect the citizenry from
unwarranted intrusions upon their personal lives, knowing
that the framers did not contemplate its extension to protect
abortion, procreation or interracial marriage. That same flexi-
bility is needed here.
Fundamental rights have been defined as those rights in
which "neither liberty or justice would exist if [they] were sac-
rificed."' 79 Against this backdrop, can it be said that the denial
of a segment of our society of those rights surrounding the
most intimate aspects of their lives is in keeping with the con-
cepts of liberty and justice? "[T]he time has come today for
private, consenting, adult homosexuality to enter the sphere of
constitutionally protectable interests. Intolerance of the un-
conventional halts the growth of liberty.
80
B. The Decision's Impact on Future Cases
The uncertainty surrounding sodomy statutes and the con-
stitutional right of privacy has made for a series of relatively
unpatterned decisions in state and federal courts. The deci-
sion in Bowers attempted to clear up some of this confusion by
refusing to protect private, consensual homosexual behavior
from state proscription. Courts looking for a "hook to hang
their hats on" will most likely follow the precedent set by the
decision. However, this does not mean that there is no hope
for those concerned with the rights of homosexuals. For these
people, the state legislatures appear to be the arenas offering
the most promise and hope.
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79. Id. at 2844 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325-26 (1937)).
80. Acanfora v. Board of Educ., 359 F. Supp. 843, 851 (D. Md. 1973), aff'd on
other grounds, 491 F.2d 498 (4th Cir. 1974).

